Two-part tariff competition in duopoly
Built on the location model, this paper studies the rivalry of two firms in an industry through two-part tariffs. It is found that kinky profit functions are responsible for the coincidence of imperfectly competitive equilibrium and cartelization outcome. A duopoly likely results in higher entry fees and industry profits and lower net consumers surplus than a monopoly because each duopolist has a smaller market size than the monopolist. But social welfare in the monopoly is lower than in the duopoly. In comparison with uniform pricing, two-part tariffs tend to have lower prices, more profits and welfare but the magnitude of net consumers surplus is ambiguous.
|Date of creation:||2000|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.latrobe.edu.au/economics|
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