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Natural Monopoly in Transport

Author

Listed:
  • André de Palma
  • Julien Monardo

    (ENS Cachan - École normale supérieure - Cachan)

Abstract

Transportation networks, such as railways, roads and highways provide

Suggested Citation

  • André de Palma & Julien Monardo, 2019. "Natural Monopoly in Transport," Working Papers hal-02121079, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-02121079
    DOI: 10.1016/b978-0-08-102671-7.10006-5
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-02121079v2
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Foreman-Peck, J S, 1987. "Natural Monopoly and Railway Policy in the Nineteenth Century," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 39(4), pages 699-718, December.
    2. Manuela Mosca, 2008. "On the origins of the concept of natural monopoly: Economies of scale and competition," The European Journal of the History of Economic Thought, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 15(2), pages 317-353.
    3. Joskow, Paul L., 2007. "Regulation of Natural Monopoly," Handbook of Law and Economics, in: A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell (ed.), Handbook of Law and Economics, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 16, pages 1227-1348, Elsevier.
    4. Philippe Gagnepain & Marc Ivaldi, 2002. "Incentive Regulatory Policies: The Case of Public Transit Systems in France," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 33(4), pages 605-629, Winter.
    5. Baumol, William J & Bailey, Elizabeth E & Willig, Robert D, 1977. "Weak Invisible Hand Theorems on the Sustainability of Multiproduct Natural Monopoly," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 67(3), pages 350-365, June.
    6. Faulhaber, Gerald R, 1975. "Cross-Subsidization: Pricing in Public Enterprises," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 65(5), pages 966-977, December.
    7. Baumol, William J, 1977. "On the Proper Cost Tests for Natural Monopoly in a Multiproduct Industry," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 67(5), pages 809-822, December.
    8. Malthus, Thomas Robert, 1815. "An Inquiry into the Nature and Progress of Rent, and the Principles by which it is regulated," History of Economic Thought Books, McMaster University Archive for the History of Economic Thought, number malthus1815a.
    9. Deneckere, Raymond & de Palma, André & Leruth, Luc, 2019. "Risk sharing in procurement," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 65(C), pages 173-220.
    10. Kenneth E. Train, 1991. "Optimal Regulation: The Economic Theory of Natural Monopoly," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262200848, December.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Natural Monopoly; Regulation; Subadditivity of Costs; Economies of Scale; Average Cost; Ramsey-Boiteux; Incentive; Multiproduct Firm;
    All these keywords.

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