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Examining Regulatory Capture: Evidence From The Nhl

Author

Listed:
  • Gregory DeAngelo
  • Adam Nowak
  • Imke Reimers

Abstract

Regulatory capture has garnered significant attention, but poses a difficult empirical exercise since most relationships between regulators and regulated parties occur behind closed doors. In this research, we overcome this problem by analyzing an environment where the behavior of both the regulator and regulated parties are publicly available. Specifically, we utilize data from the National Hockey League (NHL) to examine the impact of general experience as a referee as well as experience refereeing a particular team on the assignation of penalties. We find that gaining general experience as a referee significantly reduces the number of penalties that a referee assigns. However, as a referee gains experience refereeing a specific team, they significantly reduce the number of penalties assessed to this team relative to teams that they have less experience refereeing, confirming that regulatory capture is observed among referees and teams in the NHL. (JEL G18, L51, K42)

Suggested Citation

  • Gregory DeAngelo & Adam Nowak & Imke Reimers, 2018. "Examining Regulatory Capture: Evidence From The Nhl," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 36(1), pages 183-191, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:coecpo:v:36:y:2018:i:1:p:183-191
    DOI: 10.1111/coep.12240
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    3. Greiner, Michael & Lee, Jaegul, 2020. "A supply-side approach to corporate political activity: Performance consequences of ideologically driven CPA," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 115(C), pages 25-37.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • G18 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law

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