IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/ucp/jlstud/v26y1997i2p347-70.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Decision Costs and the Strategic Design of Administrative Process and Judicial Review

Author

Listed:
  • Spiller, Pablo T
  • Tiller, Emerson H

Abstract

The ability of Congress to structure the institutional costs of agency and judicial decision making gives it considerable control over regulatory policy. We analyze the role of decision costs through models of agency-court interaction and consider the ability of Congress to manipulate such costs for its own policy purposes We explore the implications of these models by examining recent congressional efforts to change the decision cost structures of agencies and courts. In particular, we consider the so-called Bumpers Amendments of the 1980s and, from the 1990s, the Repub1ican-proposed imposition of cost-benefit analysis on agency decision making. Copyright 1997 by the University of Chicago.

Suggested Citation

  • Spiller, Pablo T & Tiller, Emerson H, 1997. "Decision Costs and the Strategic Design of Administrative Process and Judicial Review," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 26(2), pages 347-370, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:ucp:jlstud:v:26:y:1997:i:2:p:347-70
    DOI: 10.1086/467999
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/467999
    Download Restriction: Access to the online full text or PDF requires a subscription.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1086/467999?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Pablo T Spiller & Rafael Gely, 2007. "Strategic Judicial Decision Making," Levine's Working Paper Archive 122247000000001409, David K. Levine.
    2. Paulo Correa & Marcus Melo & Bernardo Mueller & Carlos Pereira, 2019. "Political interference and regulatory resilience in Brazil," Regulation & Governance, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 13(4), pages 540-560, December.
    3. Mueller, Bernardo, 2001. "Institutions for commitment in the Brazilian regulatory system," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 41(5), pages 621-643.
    4. Gregory DeAngelo & Adam Nowak & Imke Reimers, 2018. "Examining Regulatory Capture: Evidence From The Nhl," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 36(1), pages 183-191, January.
    5. Maurice Kugler & Howard Rosental, 2000. "Checks and balances : an assessment of the institutional separtion of political powers in Colombia," Working Papers Series. Documentos de Trabajo 2117, Fedesarrollo.
    6. Gennaioli, Nicola & Shleifer, Andrei, 2007. "Overruling and the instability of law," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(2), pages 309-328, June.
    7. John M. de Figueiredo & Edward H. Stiglitz, 2015. "Democratic Rulemaking," NBER Working Papers 21765, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    8. Nuno Garoupa, 2004. "Punish Once or Punish Twice: A Theory of the Use of Criminal Sanctions in Addition to Regulatory Penalties," American Law and Economics Review, Oxford University Press, vol. 6(2), pages 410-433.
    9. Guy Holburn & Richard Bergh, 2006. "Consumer capture of regulatory institutions: The creation of public utility consumer advocates in the United States," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 126(1), pages 45-73, January.
    10. Charles R. Shipan, 2000. "The Legislative Design of Judicial Review," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 12(3), pages 269-304, July.
    11. de Figueiredo, Rui J P, Jr & Vanden Bergh, Richard G, 2004. "The Political Economy of State-Level Administrative Procedure Acts," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 47(2), pages 569-588, October.
    12. Correa, Paulo & Melo, Marcus & Mueller, Bernardo & Pereira, Carlos, 2008. "Regulatory governance in Brazilian infrastructure industries," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 48(2), pages 202-216, May.
    13. John R. Wright, 2010. "Ambiguous Statutes and Judicial Deference To Federal Agencies," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 22(2), pages 217-245, April.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ucp:jlstud:v:26:y:1997:i:2:p:347-70. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Journals Division (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/JLS .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.