Universal Service Obligations in LDCs: The Effect of Uniform Pricing on Infrastructure Access
This paper develops a model to analyze the impacts of asymmetric information on optimal universal service policy in the public utilities of developing countries. Optimal universal service policy is implemented using two regulatory instruments: pricing and network investment. Under discriminatory pricing asymmetric information leads to a higher price and smaller network in the rural area than under full information. Under uniform pricing the price is also lower but the network is even smaller. In addition, under both pricing regimes not only the firm but also taxpayers have incentives to collude with the regulator. © 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
|Date of creation:||Aug 2006|
|Date of revision:|
|Publication status:||Published in: Journal of public economics (2006) v.90 n° 6-7,p.1155-1179|
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