On optimal regulation of price and R&D with asymmetric information
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Volume (Year): 14 (2010)
Issue (Month): 3 (September)
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References listed on IDEAS
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- Thomas Kuhn & Uwe Cantner, 1999. "Optimal regulation of technical progress in natural monopolies with asymmetric information," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 4(3), pages 191-204.
- Garcia, Diego, 2005. "Monotonicity in direct revelation mechanisms," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 88(1), pages 21-26, July.
- Bailey, Elizabeth E., 1974. "Innovation and regulation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(3), pages 285-295, August.
- Antonio Estache & Jean-Jacques Laffont & Xinzhu Zhang, 2006.
"Universal Service Obligations in LDCs: The Effect of Uniform Pricing on Infrastructure Access,"
ULB Institutional Repository
2013/43913, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
- Estache, Antonio & Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Zhang, Xinzhu, 2006. "Universal service obligations in LDCs: The effect of uniform pricing on infrastructure access," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(6-7), pages 1155-1179, August.
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