Low-level versus high-level equilibrium in public utility services
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- Strand, Jon, 2011. "Low-level versus high-level equilibrium in public utility service," Policy Research Working Paper Series 5723, The World Bank.
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More about this item
KeywordsPublic utility services; Low-level equilibrium; Effort incentive schemes; Multiple equilibria; Bayesian Nash equilibrium;
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