Influencing Agencies Through Pivotal Political Institutions
We draw on the positive political theory and campaign finance literatures to examine how interest groups allocate influence activities (e.g., monetary donations, lobbying) across multiple government institutions when seeking more favorable agency policy decisions. By modeling agency behavior in the context of legislative oversight, we derive testable predictions about the political conditions under which an interest group will influence (1) only the agency, (2) the legislature and/or executive instead of the agency, and (3) the legislature or executive in addition to the agency in order to induce a shift in regulatory policy. One implication of our conclusions relating to (2) and (3) is that empirical studies seeking to identify a relationship between electoral campaign contributions and public policy using data on legislative votes are potentially misspecified. Copyright 2004, Oxford University Press.
To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download. To find whether it is available, there are three
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
Volume (Year): 20 (2004)
Issue (Month): 2 (October)
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Fax: 01865 267 985
Web page: http://jleo.oupjournals.org/Email:
|Order Information:||Web: http://www.oup.co.uk/journals|
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:20:y:2004:i:2:p:458-483. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Oxford University Press)or (Christopher F. Baum)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.