Nonmarket performance: Evidence from U.S. electric utilities
Building on a framework that assesses the attractiveness of ‘political markets’ – where firms transact over public policies with government policy-makers – we develop hypotheses regarding the success or performance of firms’ nonmarket strategies. We propose that the ability of firms to gain more favorable policy outcomes is increasing in the degree of rivalry among elected politicians; the firm’s recent experience with policy-makers; and the opportunity to learn from other firms’ recent experiences; and is decreasing in the degree of rivalry from competing interest groups and the resource base of regulatory agencies. Using data on regulatory filings for rate increases made by the population of U.S. privately-owned electric utilities over a 13 year period, we find empirical support for our arguments.
|Date of creation:||2006|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Ludwigstraße 33, D-80539 Munich, Germany|
Web page: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- North, D.C., 1990.
"A Transaction Cost Theory of Politics,"
144, Washington St. Louis - School of Business and Political Economy.
- Weingast, Barry R & Moran, Mark J, 1983. "Bureaucratic Discretion or Congressional Control? Regulatory Policymaking by the Federal Trade Commission," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 91(5), pages 765-800, October.
- McCubbins, Mathew D & Noll, Roger G & Weingast, Barry R, 1987. "Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 3(2), pages 243-77, Fall.
- John M. de Figueiredo & Brian S. Silverman, 2002.
"Academic Earmarks and the Returns to Lobbying,"
NBER Working Papers
9064, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Heckman, James, 2013.
"Sample selection bias as a specification error,"
Publishing House "SINERGIA PRESS", vol. 31(3), pages 129-137.
- Stephen Coate & Timothy Besley, 2000.
"Elected versus Appointed Regulators: Theory and Evidence,"
NBER Working Papers
7579, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Timothy Besley & Stephen Coate, 2003. "Elected Versus Appointed Regulators: Theory and Evidence," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 1(5), pages 1176-1206, 09.
- Besley, Timothy J. & Coate, Stephen, 2000. "Elected Versus Appointed Regulators: Theory And Evidence," CEPR Discussion Papers 2381, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Stephen Ansolabehere & John M. de Figueiredo & James M. Snyder Jr, 2003. "Why is There so Little Money in U.S. Politics?," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 17(1), pages 105-130, Winter.
- Guy L. F. Holburn, 2004. "Influencing Agencies Through Pivotal Political Institutions," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 20(2), pages 458-483, October.
- Mueller,Dennis C., 2003. "Public Choice III," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521894753, September.
- Dolton, P. J. & Makepeace, G. H., 1987. "Interpreting sample selection effects," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 24(4), pages 373-379.
- Henderson, Rebecca. & Cockburn, Iain., 1994. "Measuring competence? : exploring firm effects in pharmaceutical research," Working papers 3712-94., Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Sloan School of Management.
- Brian S. Silverman, 1999. "Technological Resources and the Direction of Corporate Diversification: Toward an Integration of the Resource-Based View and Transaction Cost Economics," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 45(8), pages 1109-1124, August.
- David P. Baron, 2001. "Theories of Strategic Nonmarket Participation: Majority-Rule and Executive Institutions," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 10(1), pages 47-89, 03.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:14437. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Joachim Winter)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.