BaFin (in)dependence - a reform proposal
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- Martin Hellwig & Gerhard Schick, 2022. "Versagen und Reformbedarf der deutschen Finanzaufsicht," Working Papers 2, Forum New Economy.
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Keywords
Capital markets; supervision; Wirecard;All these keywords.
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