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Partisan regulatory actions: Evidence from the SEC

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  • Pandey, Vivek
  • Shen, Xingyu
  • Wu, Joanna Shuang

Abstract

We study the influence of political partisanship in SEC investigations and AAER enforcement actions against financial misconduct. We find that the SEC is more likely to launch an investigation against a firm that is misaligned with the agency’s political ideology than other firms. The likelihood of an AAER appears unaffected by political misalignment, but once named in an AAER, a misaligned firm faces harsher penalties than other firms. We find evidence that collectively points to potential misallocation of scarce enforcement resources due to partisanship: conditional on investigation, misaligned firms are less likely to receive an enforcement action, and conditional on misreporting, non-misaligned firms are less likely to be investigated.

Suggested Citation

  • Pandey, Vivek & Shen, Xingyu & Wu, Joanna Shuang, 2025. "Partisan regulatory actions: Evidence from the SEC," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 80(1).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jaecon:v:80:y:2025:i:1:s0165410125000138
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2025.101777
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    JEL classification:

    • G18 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • K22 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Business and Securities Law
    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
    • M41 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Accounting - - - Accounting

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