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The decision to lobby bureaucrats

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  • Amy McKay

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  • Amy McKay, 2011. "The decision to lobby bureaucrats," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 147(1), pages 123-138, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:147:y:2011:i:1:p:123-138
    DOI: 10.1007/s11127-010-9607-8
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Wood, B. Dan, 1988. "Principals, Bureaucrats, and Responsiveness in Clean Air Enforcements," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 82(1), pages 213-234, March.
    2. Lea Kosnik, 2010. "Time to Pick a Fight? Interest Group Decision Making to Enter the Hydropower Regulatory Process," Eastern Economic Journal, Palgrave Macmillan;Eastern Economic Association, vol. 36(1), pages 11-32.
    3. Guy L. F. Holburn, 2004. "Influencing Agencies Through Pivotal Political Institutions," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 20(2), pages 458-483, October.
    4. Salisbury, Robert H. & Heinz, John P. & Laumann, Edward O. & Nelson, Robert L., 1987. "Who Works with Whom? Interest Group Alliances and Opposition," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 81(4), pages 1217-1234, December.
    5. Frederick J. Boehmke & Sean Gailmard & John W. Patty, 2005. "Whose Ear (or Arm) to Bend? Information Sources and Venue Choice in Policy Making," Public Economics 0502009, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    6. repec:ags:afjare:141665 is not listed on IDEAS
    7. Rubin, Paul H & Curran, Christopher & Curran, John F, 2001. "Litigation versus Legislation: Forum Shopping by Rent Seekers," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 107(3-4), pages 295-310, June.
    8. Hall, Richard L. & Wayman, Frank W., 1990. "Buying Time: Moneyed Interests and the Mobilization of Bias in Congressional Committees," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 84(3), pages 797-820, September.
    9. McCubbins, Mathew D & Noll, Roger G & Weingast, Barry R, 1987. "Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 3(2), pages 243-277, Fall.
    10. Hojnacki, Marie & Kimball, David C., 1998. "Organized Interests and the Decision of Whom to Lobby in Congress," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 92(4), pages 775-790, December.
    11. Balla, Steven J., 1998. "Administrative Procedures and Political Control of the Bureaucracy," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 92(3), pages 663-673, September.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Joshua Y. Lerner, 2018. "Getting the message across: evaluating think tank influence in Congress," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 175(3), pages 347-366, June.
    2. Choi, Seong-jin & Jiménez, Alfredo & Lee, Jeoung Yul, 2020. "The impact of political capabilities and political markets on firms' decision to lobby," Journal of International Management, Elsevier, vol. 26(4).
    3. Benjamin M. Blau, 2017. "Lobbying, political connections and emergency lending by the Federal Reserve," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 172(3), pages 333-358, September.
    4. Peter K. Hazlett & Chandler S. Reilly, 2023. "Bureaucratic rent creation: the case of price discrimination in the market for postsecondary education," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 34(2), pages 226-256, June.
    5. John M. de Figueiredo & Brian Kelleher Richter, 2013. "Advancing the Empirical Research on Lobbying," NBER Working Papers 19698, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    6. Kevin Young & Stefano Pagliari, 2017. "Capital united? Business unity in regulatory politics and the special place of finance," Regulation & Governance, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 11(1), pages 3-23, March.
    7. Nayara F. Macedo de Medeiros Albrecht, 2023. "Bureaucrats, interest groups and policymaking: a comprehensive overview from the turn of the century," Palgrave Communications, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 10(1), pages 1-10, December.
    8. Brown, Richard S., 2016. "Lobbying, political connectedness and financial performance in the air transportation industry," Journal of Air Transport Management, Elsevier, vol. 54(C), pages 61-69.

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