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Institutions for Infrastructure in Developing Countries: What We Know and the Lot We still Need to Know

Listed author(s):
  • Antonio Estache

The paper surveys the very heterogeneous economic literature on the scope and limits of efforts to match institutional constraints and needs, on the one hand, and infrastructure policy and project designs, on the other, to increase the odds of improving service access, affordability and quality. It includes a categorization of the main theoretical approaches and a brief summary of what they each contribute to the design of institutions. It summarizes the most robust conclusions from theory and evidence as well as the main gaps between theory and practice that would justify a solid research agenda. The information collected is also used to the possibility of conducting sector diagnostics.

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File URL: https://dipot.ulb.ac.be/dspace/bitstream/2013/230527/3/2016-27-ESTACHE-institutions.pdf
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Paper provided by ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles in its series Working Papers ECARES with number ECARES 2016-27.

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Length: 51 p.
Date of creation: May 2016
Publication status: Published by:
Handle: RePEc:eca:wpaper:2013/230527
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