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Bureaucratic delay, local-level monitoring, and delivery of small infrastructure projects: Evidence from a eld experiment in Bolivia

Author

Listed:
  • Carlos Gustavo Machicado

    (Institute for Advanced Development Studies)

  • Monica Yanez

    (Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Network, The World Bank)

Abstract

This paper examines bureaucratic delay within the allocation of small infrastructure projects by sub-municipal governments in Bolivia, and it presents a randomized eld experiment designed to improve public service delivery by promoting voice, transparency, and accountability among grass- roots organizations. The experiment consists of randomly providing sub-municipal governments with a mailing tracking system, which provides public ocials and grassroots organizations real- time information about the processing of small infrastructure projects requests by sub-municipal governments. The objective of this intervention is twofold. First, is to facilitate the involvement of grassroots organizations in the process of reviewing, tracking, and monitoring small infrastructure project allocations. Second, is to explicitly alter the probability of detecting inecient adminis- trative practices within district councils and, therefore, to implicitly increase the expected cost of engaging in such practices among public ocials. The ndings of this paper suggest that moni- toring tools that promote access to information by citizens might play a critical role in improving public service delivery outcomes. Yet, in settings where mechanisms of local accountability are subject to be captured by local elites or are weak, monitoring tools might have limited capacity to improve outcomes. In such settings, major transparency related reforms might be needed to improve public service delivery outcomes.

Suggested Citation

  • Carlos Gustavo Machicado & Monica Yanez, 2012. "Bureaucratic delay, local-level monitoring, and delivery of small infrastructure projects: Evidence from a eld experiment in Bolivia," Development Research Working Paper Series 06/2012, Institute for Advanced Development Studies.
    • Handle: RePEc:adv:wpaper:201206
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
    • C93 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Field Experiments
    • H76 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Other Expenditure Categories

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