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Community-Based Targeting and Initial Local Conditions: Evidence from Indonesia's IDT Program

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  • Chikako Yamauchi

Abstract

Community-based selection of social program recipients has the potential to benefit from local knowledge about individuals in need. However, this information advantage might be offset by local elite capture and administrative incompetency. Using data from Indonesia's antipoverty program, Inpres Desa Terttingal (IDT), this article investigates which preprogram conditions are associated with community-based targeting outcomes. Results show that wealthier and more unequal villages constantly target better. The findings for inequality suggest that, under certain political and program contexts, any possible influence of local elites might be overwhelmed by the ease of identification of the poor. Evidence is also found that villages with young, educated heads initially exhibit better targeting. However, they lose this advantage as the program design limits the continued monitoring of benefit allocations by the village heads. (c) 2010 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved.

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  • Chikako Yamauchi, 2010. "Community-Based Targeting and Initial Local Conditions: Evidence from Indonesia's IDT Program," Economic Development and Cultural Change, University of Chicago Press, vol. 59(1), pages 95-147, October.
  • Handle: RePEc:ucp:ecdecc:v:59:y:2010:i:1:p:95-147
    DOI: 10.1086/655456
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    1. González-Flores, Mario & Heracleous, Maria & Winters, Paul, 2012. "Leaving the Safety Net: An Analysis of Dropouts in an Urban Conditional Cash Transfer Program," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 40(12), pages 2505-2521.
    2. Elsa Valli, 2017. "Essays on social protection," Economics PhD Theses 1017, Department of Economics, University of Sussex Business School.
    3. Giles, John & Satriawan, Elan, 2015. "Protecting child nutritional status in the aftermath of a financial crisis: Evidence from Indonesia," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 114(C), pages 97-106.
    4. Schüring, Esther, 2014. "Preferences for Community-based Targeting - Field Experimental Evidence from Zambia," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 54(C), pages 360-373.
    5. Tohari, Achmad & Parsons, Christopher & Rammohan, Anu, 2021. "Capital Fundamentalism and Structural Transformation," IZA Discussion Papers 14444, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    6. Suryadarma, Daniel & Yamauchi, Chikako, 2013. "Missing public funds and targeting performance: Evidence from an anti-poverty transfer program in Indonesia," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 103(C), pages 62-76.
    7. Sudhanshu Handa & Carolyn Huang & Nicola Hypher & Clarissa Teixeira & Fabio V. Soares & Benjamin Davis, 2012. "Targeting effectiveness of social cash transfer programmes in three African countries," Journal of Development Effectiveness, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 4(1), pages 78-108, March.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • H75 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Government: Health, Education, and Welfare
    • O17 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements

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