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The regressive demands of demand-driven development

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  • Baird, Sarah
  • McIntosh, Craig
  • Ozler, Berk

Abstract

Despite their explicit focus on reaching the poor, many community driven development (CDD) projects have been found to be only mildly pro-poor in their funding allocations. This paper presents evidence of an explanation that has been overlooked in the CDD literature to date: the requirement that beneficiaries must apply for projects in order to receive support. The authors first examine data on the universe of project applications and funding under Tanzania's flagship CDD program, Tanzania's Social Action Fund, and then use a census of 100 program villages to examine the determinants of both program awareness and program participation at the household level. The data paint a consistent picture at both levels: wealth, access to information, and political capital are important correlates of the ability to navigate the application process successfully. The centrally dictated features of this decentralized program appear to be the most effective mechanisms in directing funds to the poor. The results suggest that unless demand-driven projects can develop ways of soliciting engagement from a broader cross-section of the population, they are unlikely to achieve truly progressive targeting.

Suggested Citation

  • Baird, Sarah & McIntosh, Craig & Ozler, Berk, 2011. "The regressive demands of demand-driven development," Policy Research Working Paper Series 5883, The World Bank.
    • Handle: RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:5883
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    Cited by:

    1. Newman Carol & Zhang Mengyang, 2015. "Connections and the Allocation of Public Benefits," WIDER Working Paper Series 031, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
    2. Platteau, Jean-Philippe & Somville, Vincent & Wahhaj, Zaki, 2014. "Elite capture through information distortion: A theoretical essay," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 106(C), pages 250-263.
    3. Gani Aldashev & Cecilia Navarra, 2017. "Development NGOs: Basic Facts," Working Papers ECARES ECARES 2017-36, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
    4. Bet Caeyers, 2014. "Peer effects in development programme awareness of vulnerable groups in rural Tanzania," CSAE Working Paper Series 2014-11, Centre for the Study of African Economies, University of Oxford.
    5. Carlitz, Ruth D., 2017. "Money Flows, Water Trickles: Understanding Patterns of Decentralized Water Provision in Tanzania," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 93(C), pages 16-30.
    6. Pan, Lei & Christiaensen, Luc, 2012. "Who is Vouching for the Input Voucher? Decentralized Targeting and Elite Capture in Tanzania," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 40(8), pages 1619-1633.
    7. Fiala,Nathan V. & Premand,Patrick, 2018. "Social accountability and service delivery : experimental evidence from Uganda," Policy Research Working Paper Series 8449, The World Bank.
    8. Fiala, Nathan & Premand, Patrick, 2018. "Social accountability and service delivery: Experimental evidence from Uganda," Ruhr Economic Papers 752, RWI - Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-University Bochum, TU Dortmund University, University of Duisburg-Essen.
    9. Mogues, Tewodaj & Erman, Alvina, 2016. "Institutional arrangements to make public spending responsive to the poor—(where) have they worked?: Review of the evidence on four major intervention types," IFPRI discussion papers 1519, International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI).
    10. repec:eee:wdevel:v:106:y:2018:i:c:p:407-421 is not listed on IDEAS
    11. repec:oxf:wpaper:wps/2014-11 is not listed on IDEAS

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Rural Poverty Reduction; Housing&Human Habitats; Poverty Monitoring&Analysis; Services&Transfers to Poor; Regional Economic Development;

    JEL classification:

    • H42 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Publicly Provided Private Goods
    • I38 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Welfare, Well-Being, and Poverty - - - Government Programs; Provision and Effects of Welfare Programs

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