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Utilities reforms and corruption in developing countries

  • Estache, A.
  • Goicoechea, A.
  • Trujillo, L.

This paper shows empirically that "privatization" in the energy, telecommunications, and water sectors, and the introduction of independent regulators in those sectors, have not always had the expected effects on access, affordability, or quality of services. It also shows that corruption leads to adjustments in the quantity, quality, and price of services consistent with the profit-maximizing behavior that one would expect from monopolies in the sector. Finally, our results suggest that privatization and the introduction of independent regulators have, at best, only partial effects on the consequences of corruption for access, affordability, and quality of utilities services.

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Paper provided by Department of Economics, City University London in its series Working Papers with number 07/07.

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Date of creation: 2007
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Handle: RePEc:cty:dpaper:07/07
Contact details of provider: Postal: Department of Economics, Social Sciences Building, City University London, Whiskin Street, London, EC1R 0JD, United Kingdom,
Phone: +44 (0)20 7040 8500
Web page: http://www.city.ac.uk

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