Regulatory effectiveness: the impact of good regulatory governance on electricity industry capacity and efficiency in developing countries
This paper assesses for 28 developing countries over the period 1980-2001 whether the existence of a regulatory law and higher quality regulatory governance are significantly associated with superior electricity outcomes. The analysis draws on theoretical and empirical work on the impact of independent central banks and of developing country telecommunications regulators. The empirical analysis concludes that, controlling for other relevant variables and allowing for country specific fixed effects, a regulatory law and higher quality governance is positively and significantly associated with higher per capita generation capacity levels and higher generation capacity utilisation rates. In addition, at least for three years or more, this positive regulatory impact appears to increase with experience.
|Date of creation:||2004|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Department of Economics, Social Sciences Building, City University London, Whiskin Street, London, EC1R 0JD, United Kingdom,|
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