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Renegotiation of concession contracts in Latin America

Author

Listed:
  • Guasch, J. Luis
  • Laffont, Jean-Jacques
  • Straub, Stephane

Abstract

The authors construct a regulation model in which renegotiation occurs due to the imperfect enforcement of concession contracts. This enables the authors to provide theoretical predictions for the impact on the probability of renegotiation of a concession, regulatory institutions, institutional features, economic shocks, and the characteristics of the concession contracts. Then they use a data set of nearly 1,000 concessions awarded in Latin America and the Caribbean countries from 1989 to 2000 covering the sectors of telecommunications, energy, transport, and water to test these predictions. Finally, the authors derive some policy implications of their theoretical and empirical work.

Suggested Citation

  • Guasch, J. Luis & Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Straub, Stephane, 2003. "Renegotiation of concession contracts in Latin America," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3011, The World Bank.
  • Handle: RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:3011
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Environmental Economics&Policies; Health Economics&Finance; Administrative&Regulatory Law; Decentralization; Labor Policies; Health Economics&Finance; Environmental Economics&Policies; National Governance; Administrative&Regulatory Law; Public Sector Economics&Finance;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
    • L5 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy
    • O54 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economywide Country Studies - - - Latin America; Caribbean

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