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Algunos Alcances en torno a la Institucionalidad y Renegociación de Concesiones en la Infraestructura de Transporte de Uso Público en Perú

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Abstract

Este trabajo realiza algunas reflexiones en torno a los resultados de la política de concesiones en la infraestructura de transporte de uso público en Perú, con énfasis en las posteriores renegociaciones de los contratos de concesión otorgados desde mediados de los años 90s. A partir de una revisión de la literatura teórico-aplicada y empírica internacional, así como de la evidencia nacional que surge de los contratos de concesión suscritos en el país, se identifica un primer grupo de variables clave que habrían inducido los procesos de renegociación, las cuales se encuentran vinculadas a las condiciones del diseño del contrato y licitación (el proceso competitivo de adjudicación de la concesión), así como a los mecanismos institucionales. Estos primeros resultados sugieren que deberá prestarse especial atención a las variables identificadas en este estudio, para los futuros contratos de concesión, si se quiere reducir el riesgo y el subsecuente costo de frecuentes renegociaciones.

Suggested Citation

  • Jorge Montesinos & Eduardo Saavedra, 2012. "Algunos Alcances en torno a la Institucionalidad y Renegociación de Concesiones en la Infraestructura de Transporte de Uso Público en Perú," ILADES-UAH Working Papers inv277, Universidad Alberto Hurtado/School of Economics and Business.
    • Handle: RePEc:ila:ilades:inv277
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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • K41 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Litigation Process
    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
    • L91 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Transportation: General
    • L98 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Government Policy

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