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Partenariats public-privé et investissement de fin de contrat : le cas de l’industrie de l’eau en France

Author

Listed:
  • Eshien Chong

    (ADIS/GRJM, Faculté Jean Monnet)

  • Freddy Huet

    (GREDEG, Université de Nice Sophia-Antipolis)

Abstract

L’efficacité des partenariats public-privé (PPP) dans les industries de service public en réseau a été remise en cause par de nombreux auteurs. Une des défaillances majeure reprochée à ce type d’accords concerne le manque d’incitation de l’opérateur en place à investir en fin de contrat. Le but de cet article est double. Tout d’abord, nous expliquons pourquoi l’industrie française de l’eau se caractérise par une logique de sous investissement en fin de contrat. Ensuite en utilisant une base de données collectées sur un échantillon de 5000 commune françaises en 2001, nous proposons une série de tests économétriques qui montrent que dans l’industrie de l’eau, les opérateurs privés sont de moins en moins incités à investir lorsque l’échéance du contrat se rapproche. Plus précisément, nous montrons qu’une solution adoptée par les communes pour faire face à ce problème est de se substituer aux firmes privées pour les investissements spécifiques de fin de contrat. Nos résultats confirment ainsi la proposition généralement admise par la théorie des contrats de risque de sous investissement des opérateurs privés en fin de partenariat public-privé.

Suggested Citation

  • Eshien Chong & Freddy Huet, 2010. "Partenariats public-privé et investissement de fin de contrat : le cas de l’industrie de l’eau en France," Discussion Papers (REL - Recherches Economiques de Louvain) 2010044, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES).
  • Handle: RePEc:ctl:louvre:2010044
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. n.d., 2014. "Le strategie di finanziamento per il settore idrico dei maggiori paesi europei," ECONOMIA E DIRITTO DEL TERZIARIO, FrancoAngeli Editore, vol. 2014(3), pages 331-349.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    partenariats public-privé; sous investissement; industrie de l’eau;

    JEL classification:

    • D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
    • L95 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Gas Utilities; Pipelines; Water Utilities

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