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Renegotiation of Concession Contracts: A Theoretical Approach

Author

Listed:
  • J. Guasch
  • Jean-Jacques Laffont
  • Stéphane Straub

    ()

Abstract

We construct a regulation model in which renegotiation occurs due to the imperfect enforcement of concession contracts. This enables us to provide theoretical predictions for the impact, on the probability of renegotiation of a concession, of regulatory policy, institutional features, economic shocks and of several characteristics of the concession contracts themselves. Copyright Springer 2006

Suggested Citation

  • J. Guasch & Jean-Jacques Laffont & Stéphane Straub, 2006. "Renegotiation of Concession Contracts: A Theoretical Approach," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 29(1), pages 55-73, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:revind:v:29:y:2006:i:1:p:55-73
    DOI: 10.1007/s11151-006-9109-5
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Hart, Oliver D & Moore, John, 1988. "Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(4), pages 755-785, July.
    2. Gary S. Becker, 1974. "Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach," NBER Chapters,in: Essays in the Economics of Crime and Punishment, pages 1-54 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Aghion, Philippe & Dewatripont, Mathias & Rey, Patrick, 1994. "Renegotiation Design with Unverifiable Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 62(2), pages 257-282, March.
    4. L. Wade, 1988. "Review," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 58(1), pages 99-100, July.
    5. J. Luis Guasch & Jean-Jacques Laffont & Stéphane Straub, 2007. "Concessions of infrastructure in Latin America: Government-led renegotiation," Journal of Applied Econometrics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 22(7), pages 1267-1294.
    6. J. Luis Guasch & Jean-Jacques Laffont & Stephane Straub, 2003. "Renegotiation of Concession Contracts in Latin America," ESE Discussion Papers 103, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
    7. George J. Stigler, 1974. "The Optimum Enforcement of Laws," NBER Chapters,in: Essays in the Economics of Crime and Punishment, pages 55-67 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    8. Steven Shavell & A. Mitchell Polinsky, 2000. "The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of Law," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 38(1), pages 45-76, March.
    9. J. Luis Guasch, 2004. "Granting and Renegotiating Infrastructure Concessions : Doing it Right," World Bank Publications, The World Bank, number 15024.
    10. Jean Tirole, 1999. "Incomplete Contracts: Where Do We Stand?," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 67(4), pages 741-782, July.
    11. repec:adr:anecst:y:1992:i:25-26:p:06 is not listed on IDEAS
    12. Clive Harris, 2003. "Private Participation in Infrastructure in Developing Countries : Trends, Impacts, and Policy Lessons," World Bank Publications, The World Bank, number 15124.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Renegotiation; Concession contracts; Regulation; D7; L5; O54;

    JEL classification:

    • D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
    • L5 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy
    • O54 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economywide Country Studies - - - Latin America; Caribbean

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