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A Positive Theory of Privatisation for Sub-Saharan Africa

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  • Laffont, Jean-Jacques
  • Meleu, Mathieu

Abstract

We build a simple positive theory of privatisation for countries where governments have private agendas. Privatisation occurs when the rulers of the country can fetch enough shares in the newly created firms to compensate them from the private benefits they were deriving from public firms. The comparative statics of the model suggests a relationship between the level of privatisation and the level of corruption which has an inverted U-shape. A brief look at data from Sub-Saharan Africa does not reject this hypothesis. Copyright 1999 by Oxford University Press.

Suggested Citation

  • Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Meleu, Mathieu, 1999. "A Positive Theory of Privatisation for Sub-Saharan Africa," Journal of African Economies, Centre for the Study of African Economies (CSAE), vol. 8(0), pages 30-67, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:oup:jafrec:v:8:y:1999:i:0:p:30-67
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    Cited by:

    1. Tina Søreide & Kjetil Bjorvatn, 2003. "Corruption and market reform," CMI Working Papers WP 2003:7, CMI (Chr. Michelsen Institute), Bergen, Norway.
    2. Paul G. Hare & Junior R. Davis, 2006. "Institutions and Development: What We (Think We) Know, What We Would Like to Know," CERT Discussion Papers 0603, Centre for Economic Reform and Transformation, Heriot Watt University.
    3. Antonio Estache & Liam Wren-Lewis, 2009. "Toward a Theory of Regulation for Developing Countries: Following Jean-Jacques Laffont's Lead," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, pages 729-770.
    4. Eric Maskin, 2004. "Jean-Jacques Laffont: A Look Back," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 2(5), pages 913-923, September.
    5. Antonio Estache & Liam Wren-Lewis, 2011. "Anti-Corruption Policy in Theories of Sector Regulation," Chapters,in: International Handbook on the Economics of Corruption, Volume Two, chapter 9 Edward Elgar Publishing.

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