"Consensus and the Accuracy of Signals: Optimal Committee Design with Endogenous Information''
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- Nicola Persico, "undated". "Consensus and the Accuracy of Signals: Optimal Committee Design with Endogenous Information," Penn CARESS Working Papers 45c846ad903decd7bf77b1c66, Penn Economics Department.
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- Tilman Borgers, 2004. "Costly Voting," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 94(1), pages 57-66, March.
- Martinelli, Cesar, 2002. "Convergence Results for Unanimous Voting," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 105(2), pages 278-297, August.
- Eraslan, Hulya & Merlo, Antonio, 2002. "Majority Rule in a Stochastic Model of Bargaining," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 103(1), pages 31-48, March.
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