IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/jetheo/v105y2002i2p278-297.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Convergence Results for Unanimous Voting

Author

Listed:
  • Martinelli, Cesar

Abstract

We develop a unidimensional spatial model of two party competition in which parties are better informed than voters about the bliss point of voters. The announced positions of the two parties serve as signals to the voters concerning the parties' private information. Surprisingly, in all separating equilibria the policies implemented by the left-wing party, when it attains power, are to the right of the policies implemented by the right-wing party when it attains power in turn. The driving force behind this result is that, in the event of a shock making right-wing policies more attractive, the incentives pushing the left party to the right are strong, since by winning the election it can avoid the right party implementing extreme policies, while the right-wing party can stay put in a radical stance with the prospect of seeing relatively attractive policies implemented by the rival party.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Martinelli, Cesar, 2002. "Convergence Results for Unanimous Voting," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 105(2), pages 278-297, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:105:y:2002:i:2:p:278-297
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0022-0531(01)92848-0
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version below or search for a different version of it.

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Austen-Smith, David & Banks, Jeffrey S., 1996. "Information Aggregation, Rationality, and the Condorcet Jury Theorem," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 90(1), pages 34-45, March.
    2. Chwe, Michael Suk-Young, 1999. "Minority Voting Rights Can Maximize Majority Welfare," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 93(1), pages 85-97, March.
    3. Wolfgang Pesendorfer & Jeroen M. Swinkels, 1997. "The Loser's Curse and Information Aggregation in Common Value Auctions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 65(6), pages 1247-1282, November.
    4. Timothy Feddersen & Wolfgang Pesendorfer, 1997. "Voting Behavior and Information Aggregation in Elections with Private Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 65(5), pages 1029-1058, September.
    5. Duggan, John & Martinelli, Cesar, 2001. "A Bayesian Model of Voting in Juries," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 37(2), pages 259-294, November.
    6. Milgrom, Paul R, 1981. "Rational Expectations, Information Acquisition, and Competitive Bidding," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 49(4), pages 921-943, June.
    7. Nicola Persico, "undated". "Consensus and the Accuracy of Signals: Optimal Committee Design with Endogenous Information," Penn CARESS Working Papers 45c846ad903decd7bf77b1c66, Penn Economics Department.
    8. Milgrom, Paul R, 1979. "A Convergence Theorem for Competitive Bidding with Differential Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(3), pages 679-688, May.
    9. Hao Li & Sherwin Rosen & Wing Suen, 2001. "Conflicts and Common Interests in Committees," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(5), pages 1478-1497, December.
    10. Robert Wilson, 1977. "A Bidding Model of Perfect Competition," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 44(3), pages 511-518.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Pablo Amorós, 2013. "Picking the winners," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 42(4), pages 845-865, November.
    2. Gerling, Kerstin & Gruner, Hans Peter & Kiel, Alexandra & Schulte, Elisabeth, 2005. "Information acquisition and decision making in committees: A survey," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 21(3), pages 563-597, September.
    3. Archishman Chakraborty & Rick Harbaugh, 2010. "Persuasion by Cheap Talk," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 100(5), pages 2361-2382, December.
      • Archishman Chakraborty & Rick Harbaugh, 2006. "Persuasion by Cheap Talk," Working Papers 2006-10, Indiana University, Kelley School of Business, Department of Business Economics and Public Policy, revised Oct 2009.
    4. Hummel, Patrick, 2011. "Information aggregation in multicandidate elections under plurality rule and runoff voting," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 62(1), pages 1-6, July.
    5. Patrick Hummel, 2010. "Jury theorems with multiple alternatives," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 34(1), pages 65-103, January.
    6. Paulo Barelli & Sourav Bhattacharya & Lucas Siga, 2022. "Full Information Equivalence in Large Elections," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 90(5), pages 2161-2185, September.
    7. Hongbin Cai, 2009. "Costly participation and heterogeneous preferences in informational committees," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 40(1), pages 173-189, March.
    8. Patrick Hummel, 2012. "Deliberation in large juries with diverse preferences," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 150(3), pages 595-608, March.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Duggan, John & Martinelli, Cesar, 2001. "A Bayesian Model of Voting in Juries," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 37(2), pages 259-294, November.
    2. Gerling, Kerstin & Gruner, Hans Peter & Kiel, Alexandra & Schulte, Elisabeth, 2005. "Information acquisition and decision making in committees: A survey," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 21(3), pages 563-597, September.
    3. Gershkov, Alex & Szentes, Balázs, 2009. "Optimal voting schemes with costly information acquisition," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(1), pages 36-68, January.
    4. Patrick Hummel, 2010. "Jury theorems with multiple alternatives," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 34(1), pages 65-103, January.
    5. Kim, Jaehoon & Fey, Mark, 2007. "The swing voter's curse with adversarial preferences," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 135(1), pages 236-252, July.
    6. Hongbin Cai, 2009. "Costly participation and heterogeneous preferences in informational committees," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 40(1), pages 173-189, March.
    7. Li Hao & Wing Suen, 2009. "Viewpoint: Decision-making in committees," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 42(2), pages 359-392, May.
    8. Volker Hahn, 2012. "On the Optimal Size of Committees of Experts," Working Paper Series of the Department of Economics, University of Konstanz 2012-24, Department of Economics, University of Konstanz.
    9. Timothy Feddersen & Wolfgang Pesendorfer, 1997. "Voting Behavior and Information Aggregation in Elections with Private Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 65(5), pages 1029-1058, September.
    10. Han Hong & Harry J. Paarsch & Pai Xu, 2013. "On the asymptotic distribution of the transaction price in a clock model of a multi-unit, oral, ascending-price auction within the common-value paradigm," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 44(4), pages 664-685, December.
    11. Ruth Ben-Yashar & Igal Milchtaich, 2003. "First and Second Best Voting Rules in Committees," Working Papers 2003-08, Bar-Ilan University, Department of Economics.
    12. Harstad, Ronald M. & Pekec, Aleksandar Sasa & Tsetlin, Ilia, 2008. "Information aggregation in auctions with an unknown number of bidders," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 62(2), pages 476-508, March.
    13. Iaryczower, Matias & Lewis, Garrett & Shum, Matthew, 2013. "To elect or to appoint? Bias, information, and responsiveness of bureaucrats and politicians," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 97(C), pages 230-244.
    14. Neeman, Zvika & Orosel, Gerhard O., 1999. "Herding and the Winner's Curse in Markets with Sequential Bids," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 85(1), pages 91-121, March.
    15. Tunca, Tunay I., 2008. "Information precision and asymptotic efficiency of industrial markets," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 44(9-10), pages 964-996, September.
    16. Hong, Han & Shum, Matthew, 2004. "Rates of information aggregation in common value auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 116(1), pages 1-40, May.
    17. Jun Chen, 2021. "The Condorcet Jury Theorem with Information Acquisition," Games, MDPI, vol. 12(4), pages 1-33, October.
    18. Max R. Blouin & Roberto Serrano, 2001. "A Decentralized Market with Common Values Uncertainty: Non-Steady States," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 68(2), pages 323-346.
    19. García, Diego & Urošević, Branko, 2013. "Noise and aggregation of information in large markets," Journal of Financial Markets, Elsevier, vol. 16(3), pages 526-549.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:105:y:2002:i:2:p:278-297. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622869 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.