Rules and Games
This paper reconsiders the relationship between the rules of a game and its outcomes. The authors develop a notion of rule reform that leads to the selection of Pareto improved equilibria points. They then apply this notion to a series of naturally occurring fishing rules, including examples from Malaysia, India, Brazil, Turkey, and Canada. The authors show that reforming a game is conceptually akin to reforming an economy. Copyright 1991 by Kluwer Academic Publishers
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