The Working Parts of Rules and How They May Evolve Over Time
Drawing on extensive research related to successful and unsuccessful efforts to govern common-pool resources, I wish to address what I consider to be the next important step in our theoretical understanding of complex settings. I address how we can identify the working parts of rules. It is difficult to study the evolution of institutions without a clear language for describing and analyzing the underlying working parts creating markets, governments at all levels, private property, and structures inside individual firms. Thus, this paper identifies the rules underlying institutional games so that we can study their evolution.
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|Date of creation:||Feb 2004|
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- Bardhan, Pranab, 2000. "Irrigation and Cooperation: An Empirical Analysis of 48 Irrigation Communities in South India," Economic Development and Cultural Change, University of Chicago Press, vol. 48(4), pages 847-65, July.
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- Gardner, Roy & Ostrom, Elinor, 1991. " Rules and Games," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 70(2), pages 121-49, May.
- Edella Schlager & William Blomquist & Shui Yan Tang, 1994. "Mobile Flows, Storage, and Self-Organized Institutions for Governing Common-Pool Resources," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 70(3), pages 294-317.
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