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Comparing regulations to protect the commons: an experimental investigation

  • Ambec, S.
  • Garapin, A.
  • Muller, L.
  • Reynaud, A.
  • Sebi, C.

In a laboratory experiment we test the three regulations imposed on a common-pool resource game with heterougeneous users: an access fee and subsidy scheme, transferable quotas and non transferable quotas? We calibrate the game so that all regulations improve users' profits compared to free-access extraction. We compare the regulations according to five criteria: resource preservation, individual profits, profit difference, Pareto-improvement from free-access and sorting of the most efficient users. One of the main findings is that, even though it performs better in sorting out the most efficient subjects, the fee and subsidy scheme is not the more profitable than tradable quotas.

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Paper provided by Grenoble Applied Economics Laboratory (GAEL) in its series Working Papers with number 2013-07.

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Date of creation: 2013
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:gbl:wpaper:2013-07
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