Fixed Instruments to Cope with Stock Externalities An Experimental Evaluation
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- Gaston Giordana & Marc Willinger, 2013. "Fixed instruments to cope with stock externalities: an experimental evaluation," Chapters, in: John A. List & Michael K. Price (ed.), Handbook on Experimental Economics and the Environment, chapter 13, pages 367-403, Edward Elgar Publishing.
- Giordana, Gaston A. & Willinger, Marc, 2007. "Fixed Instruments to Cope with Stock Externalities An Experimental Evaluation," Economic Theory and Applications Working Papers 9103, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM).
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More about this item
KeywordsPolicy Instruments; Renewable Common-pool Resources; Dynamic Externalities; Experimental Economics;
- D9 - Microeconomics - - Micro-Based Behavioral Economics
- D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
- H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
- H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion and Avoidance
- H30 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents - - - General
- Q20 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - General
- Q28 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Government Policy
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