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The Effects of Well Management and the Nature of the Aquifer on Groundwater Resources

Author

Listed:
  • Qiuqiong Huang
  • Jinxia Wang
  • Scott Rozelle
  • Stephen Polasky
  • Yang Liu

Abstract

We compare groundwater use under collective well management in China, where village leaders allocate water among households, and under private well management where farmers either pump from their own wells or buy water from wells owned by other farmers. Villages are divided into connected or isolated groups depending on whether there are lateral groundwater flows between aquifers underlying a village and neighboring ones. In rural China, households under collective well management use less water. Even under collective management, households located in connected villages use more water, indicating that the connectedness of the aquifers may undermine leaders' incentives to conserve water. Copyright 2013, Oxford University Press.

Suggested Citation

  • Qiuqiong Huang & Jinxia Wang & Scott Rozelle & Stephen Polasky & Yang Liu, 2013. "The Effects of Well Management and the Nature of the Aquifer on Groundwater Resources," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 95(1), pages 94-116.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:ajagec:v:95:y:2013:i:1:p:94-116
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/ajae/aas076
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Eric C. Edwards, 2016. "What Lies Beneath? Aquifer Heterogeneity and the Economics of Groundwater Management," Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, University of Chicago Press, vol. 3(2), pages 453-491.
    2. Guilfoos, Todd & Pape, Andreas D. & Khanna, Neha & Salvage, Karen, 2013. "Groundwater management: The effect of water flows on welfare gains," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(C), pages 31-40.
    3. Smith, Steven M., 2018. "Economic incentives and conservation: Crowding-in social norms in a groundwater commons," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 90(C), pages 147-174.
    4. Shaneyfelt, Calvin R. & Schoengold, Dr. Karina, 2014. "Irrigation Demand in a Changing Climate: Using disaggregate data to predict future groundwater use," 2014 Annual Meeting, July 27-29, 2014, Minneapolis, Minnesota 170586, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.
    5. Shanxia Sun & Juan P. Sesmero & Karina Schoengold, 2016. "The role of common pool problems in irrigation inefficiency: a case study in groundwater pumping in Mexico," Agricultural Economics, International Association of Agricultural Economists, vol. 47(1), pages 117-127, January.
    6. Godwin Kwabla Ekpe, 2024. "Modeling and evaluating marginal pumping fees in groundwater commons: do varying scarcity levels matter?," Environmental Economics and Policy Studies, Springer;Society for Environmental Economics and Policy Studies - SEEPS, vol. 26(3), pages 563-590, July.
    7. Eric C. Edwards & Todd Guilfoos, 2021. "The Economics of Groundwater Governance Institutions across the Globe," Applied Economic Perspectives and Policy, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 43(4), pages 1571-1594, December.
    8. Lijuan Zhang & Jinxia Wang & Guangsheng Zhang & Qiuqiong Huang, 2020. "Whether climatic factors influence the frequency of punctual on-demand deliveries of groundwater for irrigation? Empirical study in the North China Plain," Climatic Change, Springer, vol. 159(2), pages 269-287, March.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • Q15 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Agriculture - - - Land Ownership and Tenure; Land Reform; Land Use; Irrigation; Agriculture and Environment
    • Q25 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Water
    • O17 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements

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