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Comparing regulations to protect the commons: an experimental investigation

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  • Stefan Ambec
  • Alexis Garapin
  • Laurent Muller
  • Arnaud Reynaud
  • Carine Sebi

Abstract

In a laboratory experiment we test three regulations imposed on a common-pool resource game with heterogeneous users: an access fee and subsidy scheme, transferable quotas and non-transferable quotas. We calibrate the game so that all regulations improve users’ profits compared to free-access extraction. We compare the regulations according to five criteria: resource preservation, individual profits, profit difference, Pareto-improvement from free-access and sorting of the most efficient users. One of the main findings is that, even though it performs better in sorting out the most efficient subjects, the fee and subsidy scheme is not more profitable than tradable quotas. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2014
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Stefan Ambec & Alexis Garapin & Laurent Muller & Arnaud Reynaud & Carine Sebi, 2009. "Comparing regulations to protect the commons: an experimental investigation," LERNA Working Papers 09.18.294, LERNA, University of Toulouse.
    • Handle: RePEc:ler:wpaper:09.18.294
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Jakob, Michael & Kübler, Dorothea & Steckel, Jan Christoph & van Veldhuizen, Roel, 2017. "Clean up your own mess: An experimental study of moral responsibility and efficiency," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 155(C), pages 138-146.
    2. Benjamin Ouvrard & Stefan Ambec & Arnaud Reynaud & Stéphane Cezera & Murudaiah Shivamurthy, 2022. "Sharing rules for a common-pool resource in a lab experiment," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 59(3), pages 605-635, October.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
    • Q28 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Government Policy
    • Q38 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Nonrenewable Resources and Conservation - - - Government Policy (includes OPEC Policy)

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