An intergenerational common pool resource experiment
No abstract is available for this item.
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Andreoni, James, 1990. "Impure Altruism and Donations to Public Goods: A Theory of Warm-Glow Giving?," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 100(401), pages 464-77, June.
- Walker, James M & Gardner, Roy, 1992. "Probabilistic Destruction of Common-Pool Resources: Experimental Evidence," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 102(414), pages 1149-61, September.
- Gardner, Roy & Herr, Andrew & Ostrom, Elinor & Walker, James A., 2000. "The power and limitations of proportional cutbacks in common-pool resources," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 62(2), pages 515-533, August.
- Chermak, Janie M. & Krause, Kate, 2002. "Individual Response, Information, and Intergenerational Common Pool Problems," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 47-70, January.
- Morrow, Christopher E. & Hull, Rebecca Watts, 1996. "Donor-initiated common pool resource institutions: The case of the Yanesha Forestry Cooperative," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 24(10), pages 1641-1657, October.
- Fehr, Ernst & Schmidt, Klaus M., .
"A theory of fairness, competition, and cooperation,"
Chapters in Economics,
University of Munich, Department of Economics.
- Ernst Fehr & Klaus M. Schmidt, 1999. "A Theory Of Fairness, Competition, And Cooperation," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 114(3), pages 817-868, August.
- Fehr, Ernst & Schmidt, Klaus M., 1999. "A theory of fairness, competition, and cooperation," Munich Reprints in Economics 20650, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
- Ernst Fehr & Klaus M. Schmidt, . "A Theory of Fairness, Competition and Cooperation," IEW - Working Papers 004, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
- Fehr, Ernst & Schmidt, Klaus M., 1998. "A Theory of Fairness, Competition and Cooperation," CEPR Discussion Papers 1812, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Abbink, Klaus & Bernd Irlenbusch & Elke Renner, 1997.
"The Moonlighting Game - An Experimental Study on Reciprocity and Retribution,"
Discussion Paper Serie B
415, University of Bonn, Germany.
- Abbink, Klaus & Irlenbusch, Bernd & Renner, Elke, 2000. "The moonlighting game: An experimental study on reciprocity and retribution," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 42(2), pages 265-277, June.
- Walker, James M. & Gardner, Roy & Ostrom, Elinor, 1990. "Rent dissipation in a limited-access common-pool resource: Experimental evidence," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 203-211, November.
- W. Guth & R. Schmittberger & B. Schwartz, 2010. "An experimental analysis of ultimatum bargaining," Levine's Working Paper Archive 291, David K. Levine.
- Mason, Charles F & Polasky, Stephen, 1994.
"Entry Deterrence in the Commons,"
International Economic Review,
Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 35(2), pages 507-25, May.
- John C. V. Pezzey, 1997. "Sustainability Constraints versus "Optimality" versus Intertemporal Concern, and Axioms versus Data," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 73(4), pages 448-466.
- Sweeney, Richard James & Tollison, Robert D & Willett, Thomas D, 1974. "Market Failure, the Common-Pool Problem, and Ocean Resource Exploitation," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 17(1), pages 179-92, April.
- Budescu David V. & Rapoport Amnon & Suleiman Ramzi, 1995. "Common Pool Resource Dilemmas under Uncertainty: Qualitative Tests of Equilibrium Solutions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 171-201, July.
- Guth, Werner & Schmittberger, Rolf & Schwarze, Bernd, 1982. "An experimental analysis of ultimatum bargaining," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 367-388, December.
- Riley, John G., 1980. "The just rate of depletion of a natural resource," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 7(4), pages 291-307, December.
- Grafton, R Quentin & Squires, Dale & Fox, Kevin J, 2000.
"Private Property and Economic Efficiency: A Study of a Common-Pool Resource,"
Journal of Law and Economics,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 43(2), pages 679-713, October.
- Grafton, R.Q. & Squires, D. & Fox, K.J., 1998. "Private Property and Economic Efficiency: A Study of a Common-Pool Resource," Working Papers 9804e, University of Ottawa, Department of Economics.
- Claudia Keser & Roy Gardner, 1999.
"Strategic behavior of experienced subjects in a common pool resource game,"
International Journal of Game Theory,
Springer, vol. 28(2), pages 241-252.
- Keser, C. & Gardner, R., 1994. "Strategic Behavior of Experienced Subjects in a Common Pool Resource Game," Papers 94-009, Indiana - Center for Econometric Model Research.
- Erling Moxnes, 1998. "Not Only the Tragedy of the Commons: Misperceptions of Bioeconomics," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 44(9), pages 1234-1248, September.
- Herr, Andrew & Gardner, Roy & Walker, James M., 1997. "An Experimental Study of Time-Independent and Time-Dependent Externalities in the Commons," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 19(1), pages 77-96, April.
- Mason, Charles F. & Phillips, Owen R., 1997. "Mitigating the Tragedy of the Commons through Cooperation: An Experimental Evaluation," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 34(2), pages 148-172, October.
- H. Scott Gordon, 1954. "The Economic Theory of a Common-Property Resource: The Fishery," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 62, pages 124.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:jeeman:v:48:y:2004:i:2:p:811-836. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Zhang, Lei)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.