Spatial externalities and the common-pool resource mechanism
This paper expands the common-pool resource (CPR) game of Walker et al. (1990) to incorporate spatial structure with two spatially linked common-pool resources. Subjects participated in a five-player common-pool resource game under three alternative spatial structures (non-spatial, bi-directional and uni-directional linkages) within the experiment. Results indicate that behavior in the uni-directional CPR game yielded the highest average yields, whereas those in the bi-directional game were lower than in the non-spatial game. Furthermore, investment patterns in the uni-directional game were proportionally lower in the "sink" CPR than those in the "source" CPR. This behavior is consistent with the individual incentives of the game and highlights the importance of understanding the spatial structure present within our natural resources.
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