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From Decentralized to Centralized Irrigation Management

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  • Steven M. Smith

    (Division of Economics and Business, Colorado School of Mines)

Abstract

Surface water irrigators in arid regions confront public good issues for building and maintaining shared infrastructure as well as common-pool resource issues to appropriate the surface water. Drawing on the unique history of New Mexico, I explore how the transition in the early 20 th century from the original small decentralized communal Spanish irrigation systems (acequias) to centralized quasi-public irrigation districts altered agricultural development and production. My results confirm that that irrigation districts can significantly improve outcomes when investing in costly infrastructure to expand irrigated acreage, increasing farmland values up to 33 percent. However, I find no broader evidence that the centralized control of water distribution provides any gains to acreage previously under irrigation by the decentralized acequias.

Suggested Citation

  • Steven M. Smith, 2017. "From Decentralized to Centralized Irrigation Management," Working Papers 2017-09, Colorado School of Mines, Division of Economics and Business.
    • Handle: RePEc:mns:wpaper:wp201709
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    Cited by:

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    2. Smith, Steven M., 2021. "The relative economic merits of alternative water right systems," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 105(C).
    3. Wang, Weiye & Liu, Jinlong, 2022. "Lessons of government centralization and credibility: A qualitative case-study of administrative change in Jiuzhaigou Nature Reserve, China (1982–2018)," Land Use Policy, Elsevier, vol. 113(C).
    4. Leroy, David, 2023. "An empirical assessment of the institutional performance of community-based water management in a large-scale irrigation system in southern Mexico," Agricultural Water Management, Elsevier, vol. 276(C).
    5. Chai, Ying & Zhang, Haoran & Luo, Yong & Wang, Yi & Zeng, Yunmin, 2021. "Payments for ecosystem services programs, institutional bricolage, and common pool resource management: Evidence from village collective-managed irrigation systems in China," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 182(C).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    common-pool resources; transaction costs; externalities; governance structure;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • N52 - Economic History - - Agriculture, Natural Resources, Environment and Extractive Industries - - - U.S.; Canada: 1913-
    • O13 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Agriculture; Natural Resources; Environment; Other Primary Products
    • Q15 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Agriculture - - - Land Ownership and Tenure; Land Reform; Land Use; Irrigation; Agriculture and Environment
    • Q25 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Water

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