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Communication networks in common-pool resource games: Field experimental evidence

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  • Mantilla, César

Abstract

We explore the role of communication networks and message types on behavior in a common pool resource game. In an artefactual field experiment, we introduce two network structures allowing participants to transmit non-binding suggestions to the other players with whom they were connected. We study the effect of these networks on subjects’ payoffs. In a centralized network, “bad” (self-regarding) suggestions have a negative and permanent effect, whereas “good” (cooperative) suggestions have a null (or even negative) effect due to their limited credibility. In a decentralized network the positive effect of “good” suggestions is permanent (although smaller than in the centralized network), while “bad” suggestions have a more limited effect. Although allocation to positions in the network is exogenous, we find a positive correlation between network centrality and other-regarding behavior when transmitting “good” and “bad” messages.

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  • Mantilla, César, 2015. "Communication networks in common-pool resource games: Field experimental evidence," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 118(C), pages 215-226.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:118:y:2015:i:c:p:215-226
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2015.06.003
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    3. Smith, Steven M., 2018. "From decentralized to centralized irrigation management," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 151(C), pages 62-87.
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    5. Raja Rajendra Timilsina & Koji Kotani & Yoshinori Nakagawa & Tatsuyoshi Saijo, 2023. "Does Being Intergenerationally Accountable Resolve the Intergenerational Sustainability Dilemma?," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 99(4), pages 644-667.
    6. Mostafa Shahen & Koji Kotani & Tatsuyoshi Saijo, 2020. "Does perspective-taking promote intergenerational sustainability?," Working Papers SDES-2020-12, Kochi University of Technology, School of Economics and Management, revised Sep 2020.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Artefactual field experiment; Communication; Exogenous social networks;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C93 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Field Experiments
    • Q56 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Environment and Development; Environment and Trade; Sustainability; Environmental Accounts and Accounting; Environmental Equity; Population Growth

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