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Network architecture, cooperation and punishment in public good experiments

Author Info

Listed author(s):
  • Jeffrey Carpenter

    ()

  • Shachar Kariv

    ()

  • Andrew Schotter

    ()

Abstract

Following Fehr and Gäechter (Am Econ Rev 90(4):980–994, 2000 ), a large and growing number of experiments show that public goods can be provided at high levels when mutual monitoring and costly punishment are allowed. Nearly all experiments, however, study monitoring and punishment in a complete network where all subjects can monitor and punish each other. The architecture of social networks becomes important when subjects can only monitor and punish the other subjects to whom they are connected by the network. We study several incomplete networks and find that they give rise to their own distinctive patterns of behavior. Nevertheless, a number of simple, yet fundamental, properties in graph theory allow us to interpret the variation in the patterns of behavior that arise in the laboratory and to explain the impact of network architecture on the efficiency and dynamics of the experimental outcomes. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2012

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s10058-012-0120-z
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Article provided by Springer & Society for Economic Design in its journal Review of Economic Design.

Volume (Year): 16 (2012)
Issue (Month): 2 (September)
Pages: 93-118

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Handle: RePEc:spr:reecde:v:16:y:2012:i:2:p:93-118
DOI: 10.1007/s10058-012-0120-z
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.springer.com

Web page: https://sites.google.com/site/societyforeconomicdesign/

Order Information: Web: http://www.springer.com/economics/journal/10058

Keywords: Networks; Public goods; Monitoring; Costly punishment; Experiment; C91; C92; D62; D63; H41;

Find related papers by JEL classification:

  • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
  • C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
  • D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
  • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
  • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods

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  1. Simon Gachter & Ernst Fehr, 2000. "Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(4), pages 980-994, September.
  2. David Masclet & Charles Noussair & Steven Tucker & Marie-Claire Villeval, 2003. "Monetary and Nonmonetary Punishment in the Voluntary Contributions Mechanism," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(1), pages 366-380, March.
  3. Carpenter, Jeffrey P., 2007. "Punishing free-riders: How group size affects mutual monitoring and the provision of public goods," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 60(1), pages 31-51, July.
  4. Kosfeld Michael, 2004. "Economic Networks in the Laboratory: A Survey," Review of Network Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 3(1), pages 1-23, March.
  5. Cinyabuguma, Matthias & Page, Talbot & Putterman, Louis, 2005. "Cooperation under the threat of expulsion in a public goods experiment," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(8), pages 1421-1435, August.
  6. Jeffrey Carpenter & Peter Matthews, 2009. "What norms trigger punishment?," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 12(3), pages 272-288, September.
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