Network architecture, cooperation and punishment in public good experiments
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DOI: 10.1007/s10058-012-0120-z
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More about this item
Keywords
Networks; Public goods; Monitoring; Costly punishment; Experiment; C91; C92; D62; D63; H41;JEL classification:
- C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
- C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
- D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
- D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
- H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
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