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Communication Networks in Common-Pool Resource Games: Field Experimental Evidence

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  • César Mantilla

    () (Universidad de los Andes)

Abstract

This work explores the role of the communication structures and message types in an artefactual field experiment emulating the open access extraction of a common pool resource. We introduce two network structures that allow participants to transmit non-binding suggestions to the nodes with whom they were connected. In a centralized structure, \good" (cooperative) recommendations have a positive but temporary effect reducing the aggregate extraction levels, while \bad" (self-regarding) recommendations have a negative and permanent effect. In a decentralized structure the positive effect of \good" suggestions is permanent, while \bad" suggestions do not have any effect on aggregate extraction levels. Although allocation within the network was exogenous, we found a positive correlation between network centrality and other-regarding behavior.

Suggested Citation

  • César Mantilla, 2013. "Communication Networks in Common-Pool Resource Games: Field Experimental Evidence," Working Papers 201360, Latin American and Caribbean Environmental Economics Program, revised 2013.
  • Handle: RePEc:lae:wpaper:201360
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Smith, Steven M., 2018. "From decentralized to centralized irrigation management," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 151(C), pages 62-87.
    2. Mantilla, Cesar, 2015. "To suggest is to commit? A common pool resource experiment with non-enforceable recommendations," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 59(C), pages 13-20.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C93 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Field Experiments
    • Q56 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Environment and Development; Environment and Trade; Sustainability; Environmental Accounts and Accounting; Environmental Equity; Population Growth

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