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An experimental analysis of team production in networks

Author

Listed:
  • Enrique Fatas

    (ERI-CES)

  • Miguel A. Melendez Jimenez

    (University of Malaga)

  • Hector Solaz

    (ERI-CES)

Abstract

Experimental and empirical evidence highlights the role of networks on social outcomes. In this paper we test the properties of exogenously fixed networks in team production. Subjects make the same decisions in a team-work environment under four different organizational networks: The line, the circle, the star, and the complete network. In all the networks, links make information available to neighbors. This design allows us to analyze decisions across networks and a variety of subjects’ types in a standard linear team production game. Contribution levels differ significantly across networks and the star is the most efficient incomplete one. Moreover, our results suggest that subjects act as conditional cooperators with respect to the information received from the network.

Suggested Citation

  • Enrique Fatas & Miguel A. Melendez Jimenez & Hector Solaz, 2010. "An experimental analysis of team production in networks," Discussion Papers in Economic Behaviour 0310, University of Valencia, ERI-CES.
    • Handle: RePEc:dbe:wpaper:0310
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Carpenter, Jeffrey P., 2007. "Punishing free-riders: How group size affects mutual monitoring and the provision of public goods," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 60(1), pages 31-51, July.
    2. Enrique Fatas & Miguel Meléndez-Jiménez & Hector Solaz, 2010. "An experimental analysis of team production in networks," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 13(4), pages 399-411, December.
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    9. Rachel Croson & Enrique Fatas & Tibor Neugebauer, 2006. "An Experimental Analysis Of Conditional Cooperation," Working Papers. Serie AD 2006-24, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    public goods; networks; experiments;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
    • C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior

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