The appropriation of endogenously provided common-pool resources
Because game theory suggests that the origin of a common-pool resource should not affect appropriation behavior, experimental studies of appropriation from common-pool resources generally presume resources are exogenously provided. However, behavioral economic research indicates that the origin of a resource may affect the use of that resource. We investigate the potential role of resource origin by considering the appropriation of a common-pool resource after users have determined its productive capacity through contributions. Results indicate that resource origin does not significantly influence aggregate appropriation levels but that endogenous resource provision leads to individual strategic behavior.
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