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The Impact of Endowment Heterogeneity and Origin on Contributions in Best-Shot Public Good Games

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  • Todd L. Cherry
  • Stephan Kroll
  • Jason Shogren

Abstract

Economists and psychologists have long argued the origin of wealth influences individual behavior. In a previous study (Cherry et al., 2005), we found the origin of endowment did not significantly affect behavior in linear public good games with summation contribution technology. In such games, however, both Nash behavior (everybody gives nothing) and social optimal behavior (everybody gives the entire endowment) call for symmetric levels of contributions. Results from this new study indicate that the origin of wealth might matter in more asymmetric situations, such as in a best-shot public good game with heterogeneous groups. Copyright Economic Science Association 2007
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Suggested Citation

  • Todd L. Cherry & Stephan Kroll & Jason Shogren, 2004. "The Impact of Endowment Heterogeneity and Origin on Contributions in Best-Shot Public Good Games," Working Papers 04-10, Department of Economics, Appalachian State University.
    • Handle: RePEc:apl:wpaper:04-10
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