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On the stability of legislative outcomes

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  • Stephen Hoenack

Abstract

This paper argues that by arranging vote trades in the face of information costs, legislative committees contribute to the stability of legislative outcomes. A structure of permanent committees and subcommittees facilitates informational specialization and helps legislators acquire experience in their specializations. Committees arrange vote trades by adjusting amounts of recommended spending on separate items in bills that receive majority support. Each legislator is allotted a roughly equal amount of legislative spending that he can influence plus an additional amount that depends on his skill and experience as a committee member. Copyright Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1983

Suggested Citation

  • Stephen Hoenack, 1983. "On the stability of legislative outcomes," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 41(2), pages 251-260, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:41:y:1983:i:2:p:251-260
    DOI: 10.1007/BF00210359
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. James Bennett & Eddie Mayberry, 1979. "Federal tax burdens and grant benefits to states: The impact of imperfect representation," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 34(3), pages 255-269, September.
    2. George J. Stigler, 1971. "The Theory of Economic Regulation," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 2(1), pages 3-21, Spring.
    3. Kenneth Koford, 1982. "Centralized vote-trading," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 39(2), pages 245-268, January.
    4. Gordon Tullock, 1981. "Why so much stability," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 37(2), pages 189-204, January.
    5. Klein, Benjamin & Crawford, Robert G & Alchian, Armen A, 1978. "Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 21(2), pages 297-326, October.
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