IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/usi/wpaper/571.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Marrying in the Cathedral: a Framework for the Analysis of Corporate Governance

Author

Listed:
  • Ugo Pagano

    ()

Abstract

The firm can be seen as a centralization of market transactions and as a decentralization of a public ordering which allows the management of joint liabilities. The paper advances the view that the main reason for the firm’s existence is the unification and the internalization of liabilities. From this perspective, Coase's and Fuller's contributions to the theory of the firm can be married within the architecture of Calabresi's Cathedral. Because of specific (dis)investments, fundamental transformations from competition to managed bilateral monopoly take place either in the public or the private sphere and provide an explanation for the ultimate nature of the firm

Suggested Citation

  • Ugo Pagano, 2009. "Marrying in the Cathedral: a Framework for the Analysis of Corporate Governance," Department of Economics University of Siena 571, Department of Economics, University of Siena.
  • Handle: RePEc:usi:wpaper:571
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://repec.deps.unisi.it/quaderni/571.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Alchian, Armen A & Demsetz, Harold, 1972. "Production , Information Costs, and Economic Organization," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 62(5), pages 777-795, December.
    2. Freeland, Robert F, 2000. "Creating Holdup through Vertical Integration: Fisher Body Revisited," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 43(1), pages 33-66, April.
    3. repec:dau:papers:123456789/12319 is not listed on IDEAS
    4. Pagano, Ugo, 2000. "Public markets, private orderings and corporate governance," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(4), pages 453-477, December.
    5. Patrick Bolton & David S. Scharfstein, 1998. "Corporate Finance, the Theory of the Firm, and Organizations," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 12(4), pages 95-114, Fall.
    6. Ugo Pagano & Maria Rossi, 2004. "Incomplete Contracts, Intellectual Property and Institutional Complementarities," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 18(1), pages 55-76, July.
    7. Klein, Benjamin & Crawford, Robert G & Alchian, Armen A, 1978. "Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 21(2), pages 297-326, October.
    8. Klein, Benjamin, 1988. "Vertical Integration as Organizational Ownership: The Fisher Body-General Motors Relationship Revisited," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 4(1), pages 199-213, Spring.
    9. Casadesus-Masanell, Ramon & Spulber, Daniel F, 2000. "The Fable of Fisher Body," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 43(1), pages 67-104, April.
    10. Coase, R H, 2000. "The Acquisition of Fisher Body by General Motors," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 43(1), pages 15-31, April.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Ugo Pagano, 2012. "No institution is a free lunch: a reconstruction of Ronald Coase," International Review of Economics, Springer;Happiness Economics and Interpersonal Relations (HEIRS), vol. 59(2), pages 189-200, July.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • K13 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Tort Law and Product Liability; Forensic Economics
    • K22 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Business and Securities Law
    • D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
    • D52 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - Incomplete Markets

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:usi:wpaper:571. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Fabrizio Becatti). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/desieit.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.