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On division of the question

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  • Joseph Kadane

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  • Joseph Kadane, 1972. "On division of the question," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 13(1), pages 47-54, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:13:y:1972:i:1:p:47-54
    DOI: 10.1007/BF01718851
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Gordon Tullock, 1967. "The General Irrelevance of the General Impossibility Theorem," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 81(2), pages 256-270.
    2. W. M. Gorman, 1968. "The Structure of Utility Functions," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 35(4), pages 367-390.
    3. repec:cup:apsrev:v:64:y:1970:i:02:p:426-448_12 is not listed on IDEAS
    4. Davis, Otto A & DeGroot, Morris H & Hinich, Melvin J, 1972. "Social Preference Orderings and Majority Rule," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 40(1), pages 147-157, January.
    5. Paul B. Simpson, 1969. "On Defining Areas of Voter Choice: Professor Tullock on Stable Voting," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 83(3), pages 478-490.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Casella, Alessandra & Macé, Antonin, 2020. "Does Vote Trading Improve Welfare?," CEPR Discussion Papers 15201, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    2. Alessandra Casella & Antonin Macé, 2021. "Does Vote Trading Improve Welfare?," Annual Review of Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 13(1), pages 57-86, August.
    3. Fatma Aslan & Hayrullah Dindar & Jean Lainé, 2023. "Correction to: When are committees of Condorcet winners Condorcet winning committees?," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 27(2), pages 469-469, June.
    4. Kenneth Koford, 1982. "Why so much stability? An optimistic view of the possibility of rational legislative decisionmaking," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 38(1), pages 3-19, March.
    5. James Enelow, 1986. "The stability of logrolling: An expectations approach," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 51(3), pages 285-294, January.
    6. Thomas Schwartz, 2011. "One-dimensionality and stability in legislative voting," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 148(1), pages 197-214, July.
    7. Casella, Alessandra & Palfrey, Thomas R., 2021. "Trading votes for votes: A laboratory study," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 125(C), pages 1-26.
    8. Thomas Schwartz, 2021. "Parties," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 32(4), pages 462-475, December.
    9. Scott Feld & Bernard Grofman, 1988. "Majority rule outcomes and the structure of debate in one-issue-at-a-time decision-making," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 59(3), pages 239-252, December.
    10. Torsten Selck, 2006. "The Effects of Issue Salience on Political Decision-making," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 17(1), pages 5-13, March.
    11. Casella, Alessandra & Turban, Sébastien, 2014. "Democracy undone. Systematic minority advantage in competitive vote markets," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 88(C), pages 47-70.
    12. Kenneth Koford, 1982. "Centralized vote-trading," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 39(2), pages 245-268, January.
    13. Michael D. Gilbert & Joshua M. Levine, 2009. "Less Can Be More: Conflicting Ballot Proposals and the Highest Vote Rule," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 38(2), pages 383-418, June.
    14. Michael Ackerman & Sul-Young Choi & Peter Coughlin & Eric Gottlieb & Japheth Wood, 2013. "Elections with partially ordered preferences," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 157(1), pages 145-168, October.
    15. Joe Oppenheimer, 1979. "A Reassessment," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 23(3), pages 387-407, September.
    16. Gerald H. Kramer, 1975. "A Dynamical Model of Political Equilibrium," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 396, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    17. Wallace Oates & Joe Oppenheimer & Thomas C. Schelling, 2000. "Remembering Mancur Olson," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 66(3), pages 793-800, January.
    18. Dean Lacy & Emerson M.S. Niou, 2000. "A Problem with Referendums," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 12(1), pages 5-31, January.
    19. William Gehrlein & Michel Breton & Dominique Lepelley, 2017. "The likelihood of a Condorcet winner in the logrolling setting," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 49(2), pages 315-327, August.
    20. Mathew McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, 1985. "The politics of flatland," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 46(1), pages 45-60, January.
    21. Franz Urban Pappi & Christian H. C. A. Henning, 1998. "Policy Networks: More Than a Metaphor?," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 10(4), pages 553-575, October.
    22. Mathieu Martin & Linus Thierry Nana Noumi & Zéphirin Nganmeni & Ashley Piggins, 2026. "Back to Black: The Median Voter Revisited," Thema Working Papers 2026-04, THEMA (Théorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), CY Cergy-Paris University, ESSEC and CNRS.
    23. Dean Lacy & Emerson M. S. Niou, 1998. "Elections in Double-Member Districts with Nonseparable Voter Preferences," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 10(1), pages 89-110, January.
    24. Casella, Alessandra & Palfrey, Thomas & Turban, Sébastien, 2014. "Vote trading with and without party leaders," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 112(C), pages 115-128.

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