Maximum Likelihood Approach to Vote Aggregation with Variable Probabilities
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- Mohamed Drissi-Bakhkhat & Michel Truchon, 2004. "Maximum likelihood approach to vote aggregation with variable probabilities," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 23(2), pages 161-185, October.
References listed on IDEAS
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CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Marcus Pivato, 2013. "Voting rules as statistical estimators," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 40(2), pages 581-630, February.
- Truchon, Michel & Gordon, Stephen, 2009.
"Statistical comparison of aggregation rules for votes,"
Mathematical Social Sciences,
Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 199-212, March.
- Michel Truchon & Stephen Gordon, 2006. "Statistical Comparison of Aggregation Rules for Votes," Cahiers de recherche 0625, CIRPEE.
- Conitzer, Vincent, 2012. "Should social network structure be taken into account in elections?," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 100-102.
- Marcus Hagedorn & Tzuo Hann Law & Iourii Manovskii, 2017.
"Identifying Equilibrium Models of Labor Market Sorting,"
Econometric Society, vol. 85, pages 29-65, January.
- Marcus Hagedorn & Tzuo Hann Law & Iourii Manovskii, 2012. "Identifying Equilibrium Models of Labor Market Sorting," NBER Working Papers 18661, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Tzuo Hann Law & Iourii Manovskii & Marcus Hagedorn, 2014. "Identifying Equilibrium Models of Labor Market Sorting," 2014 Meeting Papers 896, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Truchon, Michel, 2008.
"Borda and the maximum likelihood approach to vote aggregation,"
Mathematical Social Sciences,
Elsevier, vol. 55(1), pages 96-102, January.
- Michel Truchon, 2006. "Borda and the Maximum Likelihood Approach to Vote Aggregation," Cahiers de recherche 0623, CIRPEE.
- Truchon, Michel, 2004. "Aggregation of Rankings in Figure Skating," Cahiers de recherche 0402, Université Laval - Département d'économique.
- Jean-François Laslier, 2009. "In Silico Voting Experiments," Working Papers hal-00390376, HAL.
- T. Tideman & Florenz Plassmann, 2014. "Which voting rule is most likely to choose the “best” candidate?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 158(3), pages 331-357, March.
- Yuta Nakamura, 2015. "Maximum Likelihood Social Choice Rule," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 66(2), pages 271-284, June.
More about this item
KeywordsVote Aggregation; Kemeny Rule; Maximum Likelihood; Variable Probabilities;
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-CDM-2003-04-09 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-DCM-2003-04-09 (Discrete Choice Models)
- NEP-ECM-2003-04-12 (Econometrics)
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