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Manipulation and the Pareto rule

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  • Feldman, Allan

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  • Feldman, Allan, 1979. "Manipulation and the Pareto rule," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 21(3), pages 473-482, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:21:y:1979:i:3:p:473-482
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    Cited by:

    1. Hayrullah Dindar & Jean Lainé, 2023. "Vote swapping in irresolute two-tier voting procedures," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 61(2), pages 221-262, August.
    2. Brandt, Felix & Lederer, Patrick, 2023. "Characterizing the top cycle via strategyproofness," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), May.
    3. Felix Brandt & Martin Bullinger & Patrick Lederer, 2021. "On the Indecisiveness of Kelly-Strategyproof Social Choice Functions," Papers 2102.00499, arXiv.org, revised Mar 2022.
    4. Özyurt, Selçuk & Sanver, M. Remzi, 2009. "A general impossibility result on strategy-proof social choice hyperfunctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 880-892, July.
    5. Erdamar, Bora & Sanver, M. Remzi & Sato, Shin, 2017. "Evaluationwise strategy-proofness," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 106(C), pages 227-238.
    6. Brandt, Felix & Saile, Christian & Stricker, Christian, 2022. "Strategyproof social choice when preferences and outcomes may contain ties," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 202(C).
    7. KayI, Çagatay & Ramaekers, Eve, 2010. "Characterizations of Pareto-efficient, fair, and strategy-proof allocation rules in queueing problems," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 68(1), pages 220-232, January.
    8. Aziz, Haris & Brandl, Florian & Brandt, Felix & Brill, Markus, 2018. "On the tradeoff between efficiency and strategyproofness," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 110(C), pages 1-18.
    9. Selçuk Özyurt & M. Sanver, 2008. "Strategy-proof resolute social choice correspondences," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 30(1), pages 89-101, January.
    10. Barbera, Salvador & Dutta, Bhaskar & Sen, Arunava, 2005. "Corrigendum to "Strategy-proof social choice correspondences" [J. Econ. Theory 101 (2001) 374-394]," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 120(2), pages 275-275, February.
    11. William Thomson, 2018. "On the terminology of economic design: a critical assessment and some proposals," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 22(1), pages 67-99, June.
    12. Bochet, Olivier & Sakai, Toyotaka, 2007. "Strategic manipulations of multi-valued solutions in economies with indivisibilities," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 53(1), pages 53-68, January.
    13. Gardner Roy, 1979. "Onymous consistent voting systems," CEPREMAP Working Papers (Couverture Orange) 7917, CEPREMAP.
    14. Felix Brandt & Patrick Lederer, 2021. "Characterizing the Top Cycle via Strategyproofness," Papers 2108.04622, arXiv.org, revised Jun 2023.
    15. Felix Brandt, 2015. "Set-monotonicity implies Kelly-strategyproofness," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 45(4), pages 793-804, December.
    16. Eraslan, H.Hulya & McLennan, Andrew, 2004. "Strategic candidacy for multivalued voting procedures," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 117(1), pages 29-54, July.
    17. Allan Feldman, 1980. "Strongly nonmanipulable multi-valued collective choice rules," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 35(4), pages 503-509, January.
    18. Masashi Umezawa, 2009. "Coalitionally strategy-proof social choice correspondences and the Pareto rule," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 33(1), pages 151-158, June.
    19. Cui, Lijie & Lu, Zhenzhou & Wang, Pan & Wang, Weihu, 2014. "The ordering importance measure of random variable and its estimation," Mathematics and Computers in Simulation (MATCOM), Elsevier, vol. 105(C), pages 132-143.
    20. Shin Sato, 2014. "A fundamental structure of strategy-proof social choice correspondences with restricted preferences over alternatives," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 42(4), pages 831-851, April.

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