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Incidence of no-show paradoxes in Condorcet choice functions

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  • Joaquin Perez

    (Universidad de Alcalá)

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  • Joaquin Perez, 1995. "Incidence of no-show paradoxes in Condorcet choice functions," Investigaciones Economicas, Fundación SEPI, vol. 19(1), pages 139-154, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:iec:inveco:v:19:y:1995:i:1:p:139-154
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Young, H. P., 1974. "An axiomatization of Borda's rule," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 9(1), pages 43-52, September.
    2. Moulin, Herve, 1988. "Condorcet's principle implies the no show paradox," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 45(1), pages 53-64, June.
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    Cited by:

    1. M. Sanver & William Zwicker, 2012. "Monotonicity properties and their adaptation to irresolute social choice rules," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 39(2), pages 371-398, July.
    2. Dan S. Felsenthal & Hannu Nurmi, 2019. "The No-Show Paradox Under a Restricted Domain," Homo Oeconomicus: Journal of Behavioral and Institutional Economics, Springer, vol. 35(4), pages 277-293, April.
    3. Joaquín Pérez & José L. Jimeno & Estefanía García, 2015. "No Show Paradox and the Golden Number in Generalized Condorcet Voting Methods," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 24(3), pages 497-513, May.

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