On combining implementable social choice rules
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- Maskin, Eric & Sjostrom, Tomas, 2001.
5-01-1, Pennsylvania State University, Department of Economics.
- Roberto Serrano & Rajiv Vohra, 2001.
"Implementing the Mas-Colell Bargaining Set,"
2001-24, Brown University, Department of Economics.
- Eric Maskin, 1999. "Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 66(1), pages 23-38.
- Benoit, Jean-Pierre & Ok, Efe A., 2006. "Maskin's Theorem with limited veto power," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 55(2), pages 331-339, May.
- Thomson, W., 1996.
"Monotonic Extension on Economic Domains,"
RCER Working Papers
431, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
- Jackson, Matthew O., 1999.
"A Crash Course in Implementation Theory,"
1076, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
- Tayfun Sönmez & Tarik Kara, 1997. "Implementation of college admission rules (*)," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 9(2), pages 197-218.
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