Nash implementing social choice rules with restricted ranges
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References listed on IDEAS
- William Thomson, 1999. "Monotonic extensions on economic domains," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 4(1), pages 13-33.
- Eric Maskin, 1999.
"Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality,"
Review of Economic Studies,
Oxford University Press, vol. 66(1), pages 23-38.
- Eric Maskin, 1998. "Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1829, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
- Schmeidler, David, 1980. "Walrasian Analysis via Strategic Outcome Functions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 48(7), pages 1585-1593, November.
- Benoît, Jean-Pierre & Ok, Efe A., 2008. "Nash implementation without no-veto power," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 51-67, September.
- Matthew O. Jackson, 2001. "A crash course in implementation theory," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 18(4), pages 655-708.
- M. Sanver, 2006. "Nash implementing non-monotonic social choice rules by awards," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 28(2), pages 453-460, June.
- Benoit, Jean-Pierre & Ok, Efe A., 2006. "Maskin's Theorem with limited veto power," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 55(2), pages 331-339, May.
- Orhan Erdem & M. Sanver, 2005. "Minimal monotonic extensions of scoring rules," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 25(1), pages 31-42, October.
- Kara, Tarik & Sonmez, Tayfun, 1996. "Nash Implementation of Matching Rules," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 68(2), pages 425-439, February.
More about this item
KeywordsMaskin monotonicity; Nash implementation; Range restrictions; Walrasian solution; Solomon’s Dilemma;
- D79 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Other
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