Individual and Collective Choice and Social Welfare
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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-662-46439-7
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Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
Cited by:
- Anne van den Nouweland & Agnieszka Rusinowska, 2020.
"Bargaining foundation for ratio equilibrium in public‐good economies,"
Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 22(2), pages 302-319, April.
- Anne van den Nouweland & Agnieszka Rusinowka, 2018. "Bargaining Foundation for Ratio Equilibrium in Public Good Economies," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 18004, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne.
- Anne van den Nouweland & Agnieszka Rusinowska, 2020. "Bargaining foundation for ratio equilibrium in public good economies," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) hal-02195948, HAL.
- Anne van den Nouweland & Agnieszka Rusinowska, 2020. "Bargaining foundation for ratio equilibrium in public good economies," Post-Print hal-02195948, HAL.
- Anne van den Nouweland & Agnieszka Rusinowska, 2020. "Bargaining foundation for ratio equilibrium in public good economies," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) hal-02195948, HAL.
- Anne van den Nouweland & Agnieszka Rusinowska, 2018. "Bargaining Foundation for Ratio Equilibrium in Public Good Economies," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-01720001, HAL.
- Anne van den Nouweland & Agnieszka Rusinowska, 2018. "Bargaining Foundation for Ratio Equilibrium in Public Good Economies," Post-Print halshs-01720001, HAL.
- M. Remzi Sanver, 2017. "Nash implementing social choice rules with restricted ranges," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 21(1), pages 65-72, March.
- Adrian Miroiu, 2018. "Single-profile axiomatizations of the plurality and the simple majority rules," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 38(1), pages 13-19.
- Francesca Busetto & Giulio Codognato & Simone Tonin, 2017. "Nondictatorial Arrovian Social Welfare Functions, Simple Majority Rule and Integer Programming," Working Papers 2017_11, Durham University Business School.
- Francesca Busetto & Giulio Codognato & Simone Tonin, 2018. "Kalai and Muller’s possibility theorem: a simplified integer programming version," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 22(3), pages 149-157, December.
- Maxime Desmarais-Tremblay, 2017.
"Paternalism and the public household. On the domestic origins of public economics,"
Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers)
halshs-01560189, HAL.
- Maxime Desmarais-Tremblay, 2017. "Paternalism and the public household. On the domestic origins of public economics," Post-Print halshs-01560189, HAL.
- Maxime Desmarais-Tremblay, 2017. "Paternalism and the public household. On the domestic origins of public economics," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 17032, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne.
- Busetto, Francesca & Codognato, Giulio & Tonin, Simone, 2018. "Integer programming on domains containing inseparable ordered pairs," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 72(4), pages 428-434.
- A. van den Nouweland, 2019. "Demand for public good as a correspondence of cost shares," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 7(1), pages 155-164, May.
- Adrian Miroiu, 2020. "Coalitions of concerned voters: a characterization of the majority rule," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 40(4), pages 2717-2722.
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