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Equilibrium allocations of endowment-pretension games in public good economies

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  • M. Sanver

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Abstract

In a public good economy where agents' preferences are known but endowments are private information, instituting an allocation rule and asking the agents their initial endowments induces an endowment-pretension game. We analyse the Nash equilibrium allocations of this game and discuss its welfare properties with reference to voluntary contributions allocations. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin/Heidelberg 2005

Suggested Citation

  • M. Sanver, 2005. "Equilibrium allocations of endowment-pretension games in public good economies," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 9(4), pages 307-316, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:reecde:v:9:y:2005:i:4:p:307-316
    DOI: 10.1007/s10058-005-0133-y
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s10058-005-0133-y
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    Cited by:

    1. Ozkal-Sanver, Ipek & Remzi Sanver, M., 2005. "Implementing matching rules by type pretension mechanisms," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 50(3), pages 304-317, November.

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